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LEWIS V. HUMBOLDT ACQUISITION CORP.: INCONSISTENT 
WITH PRECEDENT, INCONSISTENT WITH ITSELF, 
INCONSISTENT WITH THE SUPREME COURT 
Evan Toebbe∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, as a response to what it perceived as prejudicial and 
antiquated attitudes regarding disabled Americans, Congress passed the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1  The ADA was intended to 
remove the societal and institutional barriers which obstructed 
physically and mentally disabled people from fully participating in 
society.2  Unfortunately, current judicial interpretation of the ADA may 
be hampering the efforts by Congress to eradicate disability-based 
discrimination. 
In 2006, Humboldt Acquisition Group dismissed Susan Lewis from 
her position as a registered nurse.3  Lewis claimed that she was 
discharged, in violation of the ADA, as a result of a medical condition.4  
Humboldt, however, responded that it discharged Lewis because of an 
outburst in which she yelled, used profanity, and criticized supervisors.5  
When the case subsequently went to trial on Lewis’s ADA claims, the 
court refused to instruct the jury, as Lewis requested, that an ADA 
violation could be established if the employee’s disability was a 
motivating factor in the employment decision.6  Rather, the court 
accepted Humboldt’s version of liability in which an ADA claimant had 
to prove that the employee’s disability was the sole cause of the adverse 
employment decision.7  After the jury subsequently found in favor of 
Humboldt,8 Lewis appealed.  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting 
en banc, agreed to hear the case.9  The en banc panel did, in fact, depart 
 
 ∗ Associate Member, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review. 
 1. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(2), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553. 
(2008). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
 4. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 634 F.3d 879, 880 (6th Cir. 2011) (stating that Lewis 
suffered from an unspecified medical condition that, among other things, affected her lower extremities. 
She alleged that the condition made it difficult for her to walk and prevented her from working for one 
month. When she did return to work, she sometimes needed a wheelchair). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 314. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Judgement, Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp. (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 16, 2009) (No. 07-
1054-JDB). 
 9. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., No. 09-6381, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11941, at *1 
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from the “sole-cause” standard but ultimately held that a but-for test, not 
a motivating factor test, was the appropriate standard. 
Relying on prior precedent, statutory interpretation, legislative 
history, and policy considerations, this Casenote will analyze the Sixth 
Circuit’s treatment of the ADA’s causation standard, focusing heavily 
on the propriety of the Lewis decision.  This Casenote ultimately 
suggests that the Sixth Circuit failed to properly interpret the ADA and 
simply substituted one incorrect interpretation of the ADA for another 
when it adopted the “but for” test.  Part II of the Casenote will lay out 
the framework for the development of the ADA’s causation standard.  
This will involve a progression through the web of the relevant cases 
and statutes and their corresponding impact on the understanding of the 
ADA’s causation standard.  Part III will provide a more detailed 
explanation of Lewis.  Part IV will begin by briefly reiterating the 
differences between the various causation standards that may be applied 
and will lay out the current trend in ADA cases.  Part IV will then 
discuss the impropriety of the Lewis decision and argue that the decision 
conflicts with recent Sixth Circuit precedent, is internally inconsistent, 
and is not mandated by the Supreme Court.  This Part will also detail 
Lewis’s departure from congressional intent and the decision’s policy 
implications.  Part V will conclude by summarizing the arguments 
presented and discussing possible avenues for change. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADA 
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 
In 1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act and with it, Title VII.10  
This landmark legislation promotes equal employment opportunities and 
prevents discrimination against historically disadvantaged groups.11  
Specifically, Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate 
against an employee “because of” the employee’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.12  Early on, the Supreme Court established a 
burden shifting framework in which the employee was first required to 
establish a prima facie case of discrimination.13  If this requirement was 
satisfied, the burden then shifted to the employer to articulate a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment decision; and 
 
(6th Cir. June 2, 2011) (order granting rehearing en banc). 
 10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). 
 11. Mark R. Bandsuch, Ten Troubles with Title VII and Trait Discrimination Plus One Simple 
Solutions (A Totality of the Circumstances Framework), 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 965, 965 (2009). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 13. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
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if the employer was successful, the burden shifted back to the employee 
to show that the proffered reason was simply a pretext.14  These early 
cases assumed that the adverse decision was either “because of” a 
legitimate reason or “because of” an illegitimate reason.15  This 
framework, however, was soon found be to ill-suited for employment 
decisions that were influenced by both legitimate and illegitimate factors 
because it allowed employers to escape liability by advancing a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory  reason that, while not pretextual, was not 
actually the primary justification.16  Thus, the Supreme Court was left to 
determine how cases in which the motivations were mixed would be 
handled.17  The Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins helped 
to somewhat answer this question. 
B. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
Anna Hopkins was a senior manager in a Price Waterhouse office.18  
In 1982, Hopkins was considered for partnership.  Hopkins possessed 
both attractive and unattractive qualities.19  While she was viewed as a 
highly competent project leader who worked long hours and pushed 
vigorously to meet deadlines, she could also be abrasive, unduly harsh, 
and impatient with the staff.20  Instead of granting or denying the 
partnership, Hopkin’s candidacy was held for reconsideration until the 
following year.21  However, when the time came, the partners refused to 
reconsider her for partnership.22  Hopkins brought suit under Title VII, 
claiming that the firm had discriminated against her based on sex.23  
While Price Waterhouse did have legitimate reasons for denying 
Hopkins partnership (i.e. her poor interpersonal skills), it was also clear 
that Hopkins received poor reviews based on gender stereotypes.24  The 
partner reviews included comments such as, “She overcompensates for 
being a woman;” she should take a “course in charm school;” and she 
should walk, talk, and dress more femininely.25 
 
 14. Id. at 802–04. 
 15. Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides, The Hydra Problem in Statutory 
Interpretation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 859, 881 (2012). 
 16. Id. at 882. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989). 
 19. Id. at 234 (detailing both the attractive and unattractive qualities of Ms. Hopkins). 
 20. Id. at 234–35. 
 21. Id. at 231. 
 22. Id. at 231–32. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. at 235. 
 25. Id. 
3
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Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality,26 held that gender should be 
irrelevant to employment decisions and that to construe the words 
“because of” to mean “but for” was to misunderstand them.27  Justice 
Brennan found that a plaintiff in a Title VII case need only to show that 
gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision.28  However, 
in an attempt to harmonize this with the employer’s need for freedom of 
choice, the plurality found that the employer had an affirmative defense 
allowing the employer to avoid liability if it could show that the same 
decision would have been made even if gender had played no role in the 
decision.29  As this was a plurality opinion, there is a question of what 
opinion controls. Most courts have found that Justice O’Connor 
concurred on the narrowest grounds and thus her opinion is 
controlling.30  Justice O’Connor’s concurrence echoes the burden 
shifting test set out by the plurality, differing mainly in relation to an 
evidentiary standard that is not applicable to this Casenote.31 
C. Passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
In 1990, with this background in place, Congress passed the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).32  The ADA prohibits 
discrimination against disabled persons in a variety of areas.33  Title I, 
dealing with employment discrimination, mandates that “no covered 
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability 
‘because of’ the disability of such individual.”34  The ADA did not 
include its own enforcement provisions; rather, Congress cross-
referenced the ADA with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.35  This cross-
reference established that the powers, remedies, and procedures under 
 
 26. Id. at 231 (Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ., concurring). 
 27. Id. at 240. 
 28. Id. at 244. 
 29. Id. at 244–45. 
 30. While Justice O’Connor’s concurrence is typically thought to be controlling, it is essentially 
a restatement of Justice Brennan’s opinion with a different evidentiary standard; a distinction that is not 
relevant for the purposes of this Casenote.  See Widiss, supra note 15, at 884; see also Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (explaining that when no rationale has the assent of five justices, the 
court is viewed to have taken the position of the narrowest concurrence). 
 31. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 32. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990). 
 33. Id. (prohibiting discrimination in employment, public services, public accommodations and 
services operated by private entities, and telecommunications). 
 34. Id. § 102(a).  The ADA was amended in 2008 to replace “because of” with “on the basis of.” 
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2008).  This amendment is discussed briefly in section D(4) of this Casenote.  
However, most courts and scholars do not believe this amendment changes the analysis of the ADA’s 
causation standard, and, therefore, this Casenote focuses on the “because of” language.  See Widiss, 
supra note 15, at 913. 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1990). 
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the ADA would be identical to those set forth in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4, 
20000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9.36 
D. The 1991 Amendment to the Civil Rights Act 
The next major development in discrimination jurisprudence came 
just a year later with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA 
of 1991).37  Congress stated that the purpose of the act was to respond to 
recent Supreme Court decisions by amending, and expanding the scope 
of, relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection 
to victims of discrimination.38  This goal was accomplished by making it 
clear that Title VII’s prohibition against discrimination “because of” 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was satisfied when one of 
these impermissible considerations was a “motivating factor” in an 
adverse employment decision.39  The relevant language stated:  
[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a 
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors 
also motivated the practice.40 
This language, codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), represents a partial 
codification of the Price Waterhouse holding by allowing a plaintiff to 
satisfy its burden simply by showing that a discriminatory consideration 
played a role in the adverse employment decision.41 
The CRA of 1991 also amended Price Waterhouse’s holding that an 
employer had an affirmative defense completely barring liability if it 
could show that the same action would have been taken without the 
impermissible consideration.42  After the CRA of 1991, if an employee 
establishes that an impermissible consideration was a motivating factor 
in the employer’s decision, then the court can grant declatory relief, 
injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees even if the employer can show that 
the same decision would have been made without the impermissible 
consideration.43  Ultimately, while the amendment does away with the 
complete affirmative defense from Price Waterhouse, the employer still 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 38. Id. § 3 (Purposes). 
 39. Id. § 107(a) (Clarifying Prohibition Against Impermissible Consideration of Race, Color, 
Religion, Sex or National Origin in Employment Pracitces). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); see also id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 42. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b). 
 43. Id. 
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has a partial defense if it can show that the same decision would have 
been made regardless of the impermissible consideration (the same-
decision test).44  In that case, the court is limited to the remedies above 
(declatory relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys’ fees) and cannot award 
damages or require admission, reinstatement, hiring, or promotion.45  
This amendment was codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, a section cross-
referenced by the ADA.46 
E. Supreme Court Decides Gross v. FBL Financial Services 
After the CRA of 1991, courts generally interpreted the term “because 
of” in anti-discrimination statutes to be consistent with the “motivating 
factor” test laid out in Price Waterhouse and codified as amended in 
Title VII.47  However, in 2009, the Supreme Court entered the picture 
again in Gross v. FBL Financial Services and introduced doubt into this 
area of the law.48 
In this case, Jack Gross was an employee of FBL Financial Group, 
Inc. (FBL) for more than thirty years and had risen to the position of 
claims administration director.49  In 2003, however, when Gross was 54 
years old, he was demoted and his old position was given to a younger 
co-worker whom Gross had previously supervised.50  Gross 
subsequently brought suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (ADEA), which makes it unlawful to take adverse action 
against an employee “because of” the employee’s age.51 
The district court instructed the jury that it was required to return a 
verdict for Gross if he proved that his age was a “motivating factor” in 
FBL’s decision to demote him.52  The district court also instructed the 
jury that it must find for FBL if FBL proved that it would have chosen 
to demote Gross regardless of his age.53  The jury returned a verdict for 
Gross.54  Subsequently, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the 
district court due to a perceived error regarding the appropriate 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (1990). 
 47. See, e.g., Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 336–37 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing to 
and agreeing with several other circuits’ adoption of mixed-motive analysis in ADA cases). 
 48. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
 49. Id. at 170. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 170–71. 
 53. Id. at 171. 
 54. Id. 
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evidentiary standard.55  
Thus, on appeal of the Eight Circuit’s decision, the question actually 
presented to the Supreme Court was whether or not an employee had to 
present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain a motivating-
factor, burden shifting instruction under a non-Title VII discrimination 
case.56 The Supreme Court, however, did not answer this question and 
instead held that the burden never shifts to the employer defending a 
mixed-motive discrimination claim under the ADEA.57 Writing for the 
Court, Justice Thomas reasoned that Title VII and the ADEA were 
materially different with respect to the burden of persuasion and thus 
ADEA claims are not controlled by Title VII jurisprudence.58 The Court 
stated that it should be careful not to apply the rules of “one statute to a 
different statute without careful and critical examination.”59 
Title VII, the Court said, had been explicitly amended to authorize 
discrimination claims in which an improper consideration was a 
“motivating factor” in the adverse employment decision.60 The text of 
the ADEA, however, does not state that the plaintiff can establish a 
claim by simply showing that age was a motivating factor.61 The Court 
was influenced by the fact that Congress explicitly amended Title VII to 
allow for the “motivating factor” test but did not, at the same time, 
amend the ADEA to include the motivating factor language even though 
Congress simultaneously amended other parts of the ADEA.62 The 
Court also looked to the dictionary definition of “because of” and found 
that its ordinary meaning meant that Gross had to establish that his age 
was the reason that the employer decided to act or, put another way, that 
his age was the but-for cause of the adverse decision.63 Therefore, to be 
successful under the ADEA, Gross held that a plaintiff must show that 
age was the but-for cause of the challenged employment decision, and 
even if the employee shows that age was a motivating factor in the 
decision, the burden does not shift to the employer to show that it would 
 
 55. Id. at 172 (finding that the jury instructions were flawed because they allowed Gross to shift 
the burden to FBL upon presentation of a preponderance of any category of evidence showing that age 
was a motivating factor, rather than direct evidence.  The Eight Circuit reasoned that Justice O’Connor’s 
controlling concurrence in Price Waterhouse required the plaintiff to present direct evidence that the 
illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the employment decision before the burden could be 
shifted to the employer and before a mixed motive instruction could be obtained). 
 56. Id. at 173. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 174. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 176. 
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have made the same decision regardless of age.64 
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LEWIS V. HUMBOLDT 
The major question stemming from Gross was how this decision 
would impact the causation standard of other anti-discrimination 
statutes.  An area that seemed particularly uncertain after Gross was the 
ADA.  Lewis solved the dilemma on how the Sixth Circuit would 
interpret the ADA’s causation standard post-Gross.  This Part first 
discusses the facts and background of the Lewis decision and then 
describes the majority and dissenting opinions. 
A. The Facts and Background 
The facts presented to both the three-judge panel and the en banc 
court were relatively sparse.  Susan Lewis worked as a registered nurse 
at a retirement home owned by Humboldt Acquisition Corp.65  In March 
2006, Humboldt terminated Lewis’s employment.  Lewis then sued 
Humboldt under Title I of the ADA, claiming that she was fired because 
of her medical condition that made it difficult for her to walk and 
occasionally required her to use a wheelchair.66  Humboldt, however, 
claimed that it fired Lewis based on an outburst at work in which she 
supposedly yelled, used profanity, and criticized supervisors.67 
At trial, Lewis asked the court to instruct jury that it must find in her 
favor if it determined that her disability was a “motivating factor” in 
Humboldt’s decision to terminate her.68  The district court, however, 
consistent with circuit precedent, instructed the jury that Lewis could 
recover only if her disability was the “sole” reason for the adverse 
employment decision.69  Based on this instruction, the jury found for 
Humboldt.70  On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, a three judge panel upheld 
the jury instruction.71 The court acknowledged that this standard was out 
of step with other circuits but reasoned that, according to a well 
established rule of the circuit, one three-judge panel could not overrule 
another three-judge panel without an intervening inconsistent ruling 
 
 64. Id. at 180. 
 65. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 634 F.3d 879, 880 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 881 (originally before Merritt, Clay, and Griffin, JJ). 
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from the Supreme Court.72  Because contrary Supreme Court precedent 
was nonexistent, the only avenue for change would be an overruling by 
the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc.73  Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit did, 
in fact, agree to hear the case en banc.74 
B. The Majority Opinion 
To begin, the en banc panel unanimously agreed that it should 
overrule circuit precedent holding that an ADA claimant was required to 
prove that his/her disability was the “sole” reason for the adverse 
employment decision.75  This causation standard was established in the 
mid-1990s when the Sixth Circuit transplanted this “sole” reason test 
from the Rehabilitation Act to the ADA because the two acts had 
parallel protections and goals.76  The court recognized that this 
interpretation of the ADA’s causation standard was out of sync with the 
other circuits and should be abolished.77  The panel was guided by the 
rule from Gross that courts must refrain from “applying rules 
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and 
critical examination.”78  Ultimately, the court held that different words 
usually convey different meanings and a law establishing liability 
against employers who discriminate “because of” an employee’s 
disability does not require the employee to show that an adverse 
employment decision was made “solely” because of that disability 
discrimination.79 
While the “sole-cause” standard was unanimously abolished, the 
court was sharply divided on what causation standard should take its 
place.80  After doing away with the “sole-cause” standard, the majority 
then also rejected applying the “motivating factor” standard.  Instead, it 
 
 72. Id. at 879–81. 
 73. Id. at 881; see also Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996) 
(prior circuit precedent establishing the “sole-cause” test). 
 74. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., No. 09-6381, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 11941, at *1 
(6th Cir. June 2, 2011) (order granting rehearing en banc).  
 75. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 322 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a unanimous Sixth Circuit agrees that the “sole-
cause” standard is inappropriate for determining causation under the ADA). 
 76. Id. at 314.  For early cases applying the “sole-cause” test to the ADA, see Maddox v. Univ. of 
Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1995) and Monette, 90 F.3d at 1178 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 77. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 315. 
 78. Id. at 316. 
 79. Id. at 315–16. 
 80. Judges Sutton, Batchelder, Boggs, Gibbons, Rogers, Cook, McKeague, Griffin, and 
Kethledge agreed that a “but for” standard was appropriate.  Judges Clay, Martin, Stranch, Moore, Cole, 
White, and Donald believed that a “motivating factor” standard was appropriate. 
9
Toebbe: Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp.: Inconsistent with Precedent,
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2013
1572 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 81 
replaced the “sole-cause” standard with a “but for” test.81  
As is typical of most courts that have analyzed this issue, the majority 
briefly detailed the history of the ADA and other anti-discrimination 
statutes.82  Specifically, the court noted that Congress passed Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to make it unlawful to discriminate 
against an individual because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
sex, or national origin.83  The court then stated that Price Waterhouse 
created a burden shifting framework for Title VII claims in which an 
employee who proved that discrimination was a motivating factor in the 
employment decision was able to shift the burden to the employer who 
was required to prove that the same decision would have been made 
regardless of the impermissible discrimination.84  Then, two years after 
the Price Waterhouse decision, Congress passed the CRA of 1991 
codifying that an unlawful employment practice was established if race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in an 
adverse employment decision and allowing limited remedies, consisting 
of declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney’s fees, when the 
employer can show that the same decision would have been made 
regardless.85 
The Lewis majority believed that they were only two ways to interpret 
this history.86  The first possibility was that Price Waterhouse defined 
the meaning of “because of” for Title VII and all similarly-worded anti-
discrimination statutes as incorporating a “motivating factor” standard.87  
The other option, the majority believed, was that by amending only Title 
VII to allow recovery under a “motivating factor” standard, Congress 
made this standard available to Title VII claimants but did not extend 
this framework to other similar statutes.88 
The majority then stated that the Gross Court adopted the second 
option by deciding that the “motivating factor” standard did not apply to 
the ADEA.89  The majority was persuaded by the Gross Court’s 
reasoning that rules applicable to one standard should not be casually 
applied to a different statute.90  The majority emphasized the Gross 
Court’s concern that while Title VII was amended to include a 
 
 81. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 321. 
 82. Id. at 317. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 318. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
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“motivating factor” standard, the ADEA was not similarly amended.91  
Likewise, when Congress amended the ADA through the Civil Rights 
Acts of 1991, it did not specifically provide for an ADA “motivating 
factor” standard.92  This, the majority reasoned, must be presumed to be 
an intentional omission.93 
The majority also rejected the argument that the ADA’s cross-
reference of Title VII alleviates the concern about not specifically 
incorporating the motivating factor language into the ADA.94  This 
majority emphasized the fact that the ADA’s cross-reference to Title VII 
does not include section 2000e-2 of Title VII, which actually 
enumerates the “motivating factor” standard.95  The majority further 
rejected the argument that this issue is cured by the fact that section 
2000e-5, which is explicitly cross-referenced by the ADA, establishes a 
set of limited remedies for claimants who demonstrate that 
discrimination was a motivating factor in an adverse employment 
decision.96  The majority reasoned that the language of section 2000e-5 
allows limited remedies only if the claimant can prove that 
discrimination was a motivating factor under section 2000e-2, which 
ADA claimants cannot do as 2000e-2 refers to discrimination based on 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; not a disability.97 
Finally, the majority was not persuaded by the legislative history 
tending to show that Congress desired the ADA to be analyzed under a 
“motivating factor” standard.98  The majority reasoned that the best 
indicator of legislative intent is the meaning of the actual text enacted, 
not legislative reports.99  Further, the Lewis majority said it would not be 
persuaded by legislative history because the Gross Court was not 
persuaded by similar legislative history regarding the ADEA.100 
C. The Dissenting Opinions 
In total, seven of the 16 judges, while agreeing with the majority’s 
decision to discontinue the application of the “sole-cause” standard, 
argued that the appropriate causation standard was a “motivating factor” 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 319. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 319–20. 
 97. Id. at 320. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 321. 
 100. Id. 
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test.101  
1. Judge Clay: Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
Judge Clay, joined by Judge Martin, began his opinion by concurring 
in the majority’s judgment that the “sole-cause” standard should no 
longer be applied.102  This, however, is where the agreement ended.  
Judge Clay argued that because the ADA, unlike the ADEA, is 
explicitly tied to Title VII, the court’s decision in this case was not 
controlled by the Gross decision; rather, careful examination of the 
ADA makes clear that a claimant only needs to prove that 
discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse decision.103  In 
support, Judge Clay argued that because the ADA explicitly cross-
references the “powers, remedies, and procedures” of Title VII, the 
remedies provided by Title VII, including any changing interpretations 
or amendments thereto, apply with equal force to the ADA.104 
Judge Clay also argued that a “but for” standard—requiring the 
plaintiff to prove that the adverse decision would not have been made 
absent any discrimination—barely lessens the burden imposed by the 
“sole-cause” standard.105  He also expressed concern that it will be too 
difficult for plaintiffs to identify the exact state of mind of the employer 
and too easy for the employer to avoid liability by simply offering a 
myriad of non-discriminatory reasons for the decision.106  According to 
Judge Clay, this is not compatible with the goal of ameliorating 
disability-based discrimination.107 
2. Judge Stranch: Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
Judge Stranch, joined by Judges Moore, Cole, and White, weighed in 
next.108  Joining with her fellow justices, Judge Stranch concurred in the 
majority’s opinion that the “sole-cause” standard should be 
abandoned.109  The concurrence however ended there, and Judge 
Stranch dissented from the majority’s view that a “but for” standard 
 
 101. Judge Sutton delivered the opinion of the court, in which Batchelder, C.J., Boggs, Gibbons, 
Rogers, Cook, McKeague, Griffin, and Kethledge, JJ., joined. Clay, Martin, Stranch, More, Cole, White, 
and Donald, JJ., concurred in part and dissented in part.  Id. at 312. 
 102. Id. at 322 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
  103. Id. at 324. 
 104. Id. at 322. 
 105. Id. at 323. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 324. 
 108. Id. at 325 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 109. Id. 
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should be applied to the ADA.110 
Judge Stranch began by discussing the importance of the ADA’s 
timing.111  At the time the ADA was enacted, Price Waterhouse had just 
interpreted the phrase “because of” to include a “motivating factor” 
standard.112  With this context, Congress assumed that “because of” in 
the ADA would be understood consistent with its contemporary 
meaning.113  Further, Judge Stranch argued that the cross-reference not 
only determined the ADA’s causation standard at that time, but 
permanently linked the two statutes and ensured they would evolve in 
tandem.114 
Judge Stranch then took issue with the majority’s use of Gross in 
guiding its decision.115  With Gross itself teaching that statutory 
interpretation should be an individualized inquiry, applying Gross—a 
case analyzing the ADEA—to this ADA claim was improper.116  Judge 
Stranch pointed out that the ADEA, while also prohibiting adverse 
employment decisions “because of” discrimination, was adopted in 
1967, well outside the context of Price Waterhouse’s interpretation that 
“because of” includes a “motivating factor” standard.117  Further, the 
ADEA never cross-referenced Title VII as the ADA does.118  According 
to Judge Stranch, these differences make the Gross decision inapplicable 
to an ADA case.119 
Additionally, Judge Stranch took issue with the majority’s statement 
that it would not be persuaded by legislative history because the Gross 
Court was not persuaded by the legislative history.120  The history of the 
ADEA, Judge Stranch argued, is not the history of the ADA.121  Judge 
Stranch then cited a House Report for the ADA that explained “if the 
powers, remedies and procedures changed in Title VII . . . , they will 
change identically under the ADA for persons with disabilities.”122  The 
same report stated that “the purpose of the ADA [is] to provide civil 
rights protections for persons with disabilities that are parallel to those 
 
 110. Id. at 325–26. 
 111. Id. at 326. 
 112. Id. at 326–27. 
 113. Id. at 329. 
 114. Id. at 326. 
 115. Id. at 327. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 329. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id.  at 327. 
 120. Id. at 331. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (III), at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
471). 
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available to minorities and women.”123  Accordingly, to be faithful to 
the fundamental purpose of statutory construction, namely giving effect 
to the original meaning of the words Congress chose, Judge Stranch 
believed that the court was required to adopt a “motivating factor” 
standard.124 
3. Judge Donald: Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part 
The final opinion was Judge Donald’s partial concurrence and partial 
dissent. Like her colleagues, Judge Donald welcomed the abandonment 
of the “sole-cause” standard.125  Again, the dissent was based on an 
inability to accept the majority’s definition of “because of.”126 
Rather than simply stating her view alone, Judge Donald laid out four 
possible views of the proper ADA causation standard, only two of which 
are relevant for this Casenote.127  One of the views was the majority’s 
position that “because of” means “but for.”128  Under this view, no 
burden shifting is allowed and the burden is the plaintiff’s alone to show 
that the adverse employment decision would not have been made absent 
any discrimination.129  Judge Donald could not accept this view.130 
The other relevant view discussed by Judge Donald, and the one she 
ultimately agreed with, was that the express linkage between the ADA 
and Title VII shows that a “motivating factor” standard is appropriate 
for the ADA.131  Judge Donald rejected the argument that the 
“motivating factor” standard is inapplicable to the ADA simply because 
Title VII’s “motivating factor” test appears in section 2000e-2(m), a 
section that is not cross-referenced in the ADA.132  Judge Donald 
pointed out that section 2000e-2 is expressly referenced twice in section 
2000e-5 of Title VII, a section that is explicitly referenced in the 
 
 123. Id. (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing H.R REP. NO. 101-485 (III), 
at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471). 
 124. Id. (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 125. Id. (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 126. Id. at 332. 
 127. Id. at 335.  The four views included: (1) Price Waterhouse burden shifting applies to the 
ADA but was nullified as to Title VII by the CRA of 1991; (2) motivating factor is the causation 
standard for the ADA, based solely on the plain meaning of “because of;” (3) neither Price Waterhouse 
or Title VII apply to the ADA, and because the ADA lacks explicit mixed-motive language, “because 
of” in the ADA, means but-for; and (4) motivating factor is the causation standard for the ADA due to 
the ADA’s explicit link to Title VII.  Id.  Only views three and four are discussed in this footnote. 
 128. Id. at 338. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 339. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 340. 
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ADA.133 Further, the ADA cross-references section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of 
Title VII, which provides remedies for plaintiffs who can establish a 
claim under 2000e-2(m), but limits those remedies if the employer is 
able to show that the same decision would have been made regardless of 
the discriminatory consideration.134  Judge Donald argued that by 
explicitly linking section 2000e-5 of Title VII to the ADA, Congress 
declared that ADA plaintiffs are entitled to all the remedies described 
therein (i.e. liability under a “motivating factor” standard).135 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This discussion will analyze both the impact and correctness of the 
Lewis decision, ultimately coming to the conclusion that the case was 
wrongly decided.  Part A will discuss the impact of the decision; Part B 
will argue that the majority’s decision in Lewis was inconsistent with 
circuit precedent; Part C details the internal inconsistencies in Lewis; 
and, finally, Part D discusses while the Lewis majority’s decision was 
not mandated by Supreme Court precedent. 
A. What is at Stake 
Before discussing the Lewis case in detail, it is useful to clearly define 
each relevant causation standard and briefly lay out the current state of 
the law. 
1. The Causation Standards: What Do They Mean 
At this point, three causation standards have been discussed: the 
“sole-cause” test, the “but for” test, and the “motivating factor” test.  
The “sole-cause” test imputes the lowest standard of care on employers 
and requires the claimant to prove that the adverse employment decision 
was made exclusively based on the impermissible consideration and for 
no other reason.  This test is no longer followed by any circuit.136  The 
“but for” test, the test adopted by the Lewis majority, requires the 
claimant to prove that the impermissible consideration was the 
determinative factor in the adverse employment decision and, if other 
legitimate reasons contributed to the decision, that the same decision 
would not have been made absent the discriminatory consideration.137  
 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 315. 
 137. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d. 957, 961–62 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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Finally, the “motivating factor” standard allows the claimant to establish 
a prima facie claim simply by showing that the impermissible 
consideration influenced the adverse decision, even if other factors also 
influenced the decision.138  A key distinction between the “but for” 
standard and the “motivating factor” standard is that the “motivating 
factor” standard allows the claimant, after establishing that an 
impermissible consideration motivated the adverse decision, to shift the 
burden to the employer to prove that the same decision would have been 
made regardless.139  Then, even if the employer is successful in doing 
so, the plaintiff is still entitled to limited remedies simply because the 
employer negatively considered the impermissible factor (i.e. the 
discriminatory factor).140 
By way of example, consider an employer who terminates an 
employee for being disabled, rude, and often late.  Under the “sole-
cause” test no liability could be established because the disability was 
not the sole reason for the adverse decision—the rudeness and tardiness 
also played a part.  Under the “but for” test, liability could be 
established only if the employee could prove that the rudeness and 
tardiness alone were not enough for the employer to make the same 
decision or, put another way, that had it not been for the disability, the 
employee would not have been terminated.  Under the “motivating 
factor” standard, the employee could establish liability simply by 
showing the disability played a role in the decision. 
2. The Current State of the Law 
Prior to the Gross decision, most circuits applied the “motivating 
factor” standard in reviewing ADA claims.141  However, after the 
Supreme Court decided Gross, the trend among circuits has been to 
apply the “but for” test.  Currently, the Sixth Circuit in Lewis and the 
Seventh Circuit in Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc. have 
explicitly adopted the “but for” test for the ADA.142  At this point, the 
only other federal appeals court that has explicitly adopted the “but for” 
test as the ADA’s causation standard is the First Circuit.143  However, 
 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2009). 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Pinkerton v. Spellings, 529 F.3d 513, 519 (5th Cir. 2008); Head v. Glacier Nw., 
Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 337 
(2d Cir. 2000); Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir. 1999); Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 
26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir. 1995). 
 142. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 314 (6th Cir. 2012); see also 
Serwatka, 591 F.3d. at 962 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 143. Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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some circuits that have not yet had a chance to finally decide the issue 
have indicated that the “motivating factor” test may no longer apply to 
the ADA after Gross.144 
The matter, however, is far from being settled.  The Fifth Circuit in 
Smith v. Xerox Corp. seems to have indicated an unwillingness to 
blindly apply the reasoning in Gross to other anti-discrimination 
statutes.145  The Smith court was faced with determining whether the 
“motivating factor” standard from Title VII’s discrimination provision 
should apply to Title VII’s retaliation provision which does not contain, 
and was never amended to include, motivating factor language.146  The 
Fifth Circuit held that a simplified application of Gross to Title VII 
retaliation claims would be contrary to Gross’s admonition against 
intermingling the interpretations of two statutory schemes, and 
concluded that the motivating factor framework was controlling.147  This 
decision may indicate an unwillingness of the Fifth Circuit to apply 
Gross to the ADA.148  In addition, there are district courts still applying 
the “motivating factor” standard to the ADA.149 
The importance of analyzing this area of the law is only enhanced by 
the current uncertainty.  While the law seems to be trending in favor of a 
“but for” standard, the answer is not definitive.  Through careful 
examination, we can understand why Lewis, and any case concurring in 
its reasoning, was wrongly decided and hopefully help reverse the 
current trend. 
B. Lewis is Inconsistent with Sixth Circuit Precedent 
The first issue with the majority’s decision in Lewis is the 
inconsistency with circuit precedent.  After the Gross decision, the Sixth 
Circuit initially showed an ability to critically analyze other anti-
discrimination statutes as opposed to blindly applying the reasoning of 
the Gross Court.  In Hunter v. Valley Local Sch., the plaintiff alleged 
that she was placed on involuntary leave in violation of the Family 
 
 144. See Bolmer v. Oliveria, 594 F.3d 134, 148 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding it “questionable” whether 
ADA discrimination claims can proceed on mixed-motive theory after Gross); see also Pulczinski v. 
Trinity Structural Towers, Inc., 691 F.3d 996, 1002 (8th Cir. 2012) (declining to decide the issue until it 
is explicitly briefed by the parties). 
 145. Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 330 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 146. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 328 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 147. Smith, 602 F.3d at 328–29. 
 148. Allison P. Sues, Gross’ed Out: The Seventh Circuit’s Over Extension of Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services into the ADA Context, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 356, 364 (2010). 
 149. Doe v. Deer Mountain Day Camp, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 2d 324, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); see also 
George v. Roush & Yates Racing Engines, LLC., No. 5:11CV00025, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115495, at 
*6–7 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 16, 2012).  But see Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs., 719 F. Supp. 2d 484, 
503 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (applying a “but for” standard). 
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Medical Leave Act (FMLA).150  The Sixth Circuit stated that it relies on 
Title VII precedent to analyze FMLA claims, but noted that Gross 
reminded the court that Title VII does not automatically control the 
construction of other employment discrimination statutes.151  
Ultimately, after careful analysis of the FMLA, the Sixth Circuit found 
that the “motivating factor” standard, even after Gross, continued to 
apply to the FMLA.152  Scholars on the subject cited this case as an 
indication that the Sixth Circuit would not liberally apply Gross to other 
anti-discrimination statutes and specifically would not follow the 
Seventh Circuit’s application of Gross in the context of the ADA.153  
The Lewis majority then abruptly decided that the “motivating factor” 
standard would be available only under Title VII and not under any 
other civil rights statutes (and therefore not available to the ADA).154  In 
making this decision, the Sixth Circuit contradicted itself when, even 
after Gross, it had already applied the “motivating factor” standard to a 
civil rights statute, the FMLA.155 
C. The Inconsistencies in Lewis 
The Lewis decision was also internally inconsistent.  The majority 
began its opinion by purporting to be true to the mandate laid down in 
Gross: that courts must refrain from applying rules applicable under one 
statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.156 
With this caveat, the majority decided that a careful and critical 
examination revealed that it should not continue to apply the “sole-
cause” test, a test previously imported from the Rehabilitation Act, to 
the ADA.157 However, the majority then reversed course and shunned 
the careful and critical examination requirement when it failed to 
critically examine the ADA and, instead, applied Gross in a blanket 
fashion by assuming that the Supreme Court’s analysis of the ADEA 
completely transferred to the ADA.158 Rather than carefully analyzing 
the history, context, or purpose of the ADA, the majority hung its 
decision on the fact that Title VII was amended by the CRA of 1991 to 
 
 150. Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 689 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 151. Id. at 691. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Sues, supra note 148, at 364. 
 154. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 318 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 155. See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726–28 (2003) (finding that the 
FMLA is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the 14th Amendment equal protection clause 
as it prevents gender based discrimination in the workplace). 
 156. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 316. 
 157. Id. at 317. 
 158. Id. at 329 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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include motivating factor language while the ADA, like the ADEA, was 
not which it assumed was an indication that Congress did not intend the 
“motivating factor” standard to apply to the ADA.159  It did not, 
however, do a careful analysis of the context in which the ADA was 
adopted and its relationship to Title VII, which would have shown that 
the ADA did not need to be amended to accomplish this goal.160  
Furthermore, the majority failed to do a careful analysis of the 
numerous differences between the ADEA and the ADA before it applied 
ADEA reasoning to the ADA.  Instead the majority said, “[E]very 
salient argument in favor of importing the ‘motivating factor’ burden 
shifting test from Title VII into the ‘because of’ test of the ADA was 
made in Gross.”161  Using the reasoning of Gross—an ADEA case—to 
preordain the outcome of an ADA case expressly violates the 
requirement that a careful and critical examination of the statute in 
question is needed before mapping the causation standard of one statute 
onto the causation standard of another statute.162  The majority also 
discussed the impact of the legislative history on the ADA’s causation 
standard, but ultimately found it unpersuasive because it, “did not alter 
the outcome in Gross with respect to the ADEA, [and thus] it is difficult 
to see why it would make a difference [in the ADA].”163  This is a 
blatant example of the majority blindly applying the Court’s reasoning 
in Gross and failing to examine the ADA on its own terms. 
Additionally, the majority was inconsistent in its discussion of policy 
implications.  When discussing why the “sole-cause” test should be 
discarded, the majority noted that Congress may find this standard 
inconsistent with “a statute designed to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”164  After acknowledging this 
purpose, the majority then applied a “but for” test.  This test is also 
inconsistent with a desire to eliminate disability discrimination as it 
places a heavy burden on the plaintiff and allows discrimination to play 
a role in employment decision so long as it is not the but-for cause.165 
The policy implications of the majority’s decision are more fully 
discussed in Part (D)(5). 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (explaining the importance of considering the timing of the Price Waterhouse case, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and the ADA). 
 161. Id. at 321. 
 162. Id. at 316 (the majority citing the requirement that courts must refrain from applying rules 
applicable under one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination). 
 163. Id. at 321. 
 164. Id. at 316 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006)). 
 165. Id. at 323 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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D. The Lewis Decision Was Not Mandated by Gross 
For the numerous reasons discussed below, the Lewis decision was 
not mandated by Supreme Court precedent.  Part 1 will discuss a 
foundational error which infected the Lewis majority’s interpretation of 
Supreme Court precedent; Part 2 will discuss the impact of the ADA’s 
cross-references to Title VII; Part 3 will discuss the significance of the 
timing of the ADA’s enactment; Part 4 will argue that the Lewis 
decision is contrary to clear legislative intent; and Part 5 will make a 
policy-based argument. 
1. The Foundational Error of Lewis 
The majority built its decision on an unsound foundation when it 
argued that Price Waterhouse and the subsequent legal history, 
including the CRA of 1991, could only be interpreted two ways: 1) the 
CRA of 1991 codified Price Waterhouse and “because of” always 
means a “motivating factor” standard applies, or 2) a “motivating 
factor” standard applies to Title VII only and to no other civil rights 
statutes.166  With this false dichotomy in place, the majority, drawing 
from Gross, found that the second theory was correct and that Congress 
intended to provide a “motivating factor” standard to Title VII 
claimants, but not to claimants under other civil rights statutes.167  With 
this framework infecting the majority’s entire analysis, the erroneous 
outcome that a “motivating factor” standard does not apply to the ADA 
(a civil rights statute) is a foregone conclusion.168  So why is this 
dichotomy wrong?  The first view is too simplistic.  Congress did not 
simply codify Price Waterhouse through the CRA of 1991; rather, it 
departed from Price Waterhouse in a key way by allowing liability to be 
established based simply on proof that an impermissible consideration 
was a motivating factor even when the employer was able to prove the 
same decision would have been made absent the impermissible 
consideration.169  But the second view, the idea that the CRA of 1991 
was meant to completely nullify the applicability of the Price 
Waterhouse burden shifting, is also wrong.170  Again, instead of doing a 
careful analysis of the ADA as required by the Supreme Court, the 
majority in Lewis supported it position by arguing that it was mandated 
 
 166. Id. at 318. 
 167. Id. at 327 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 334 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 170. Id. 
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by Gross, a case involving a totally different statute.171  The conclusion 
that a “motivating factor” framework no longer applies to other civil 
rights statutes is especially odd when the Sixth Circuit itself, post Gross, 
has held that a “motivating factor” standard applies in the context of the 
FMLA, itself a civil rights statute.172  The fact that the CRA of 1991 was 
not meant to nullify the applicability of a “motivating factor” standard to 
other anti-discrimination states, and the ADA in particular, is rooted in 
the text of the ADA, the context in which the ADA was adopted, and the 
statute’s legislative history. 
2. The ADA’s Cross-reference to Title VII 
A major tenet of the majority’s position was that, through the CRA of 
1991, Congress amended Title VII to include motivating factor language 
but at the same time neglected to add this language to the ADA.173  
According to the majority, this omission was intentional and should be 
considered a signal that the “motivating factor” standard does not apply 
to the ADA.174  This reasoning is largely drawn from analogous 
reasoning by the Gross Court which made a similar argument regarding 
the ADEA.175  However, the majority failed to recognize a major 
problem with simply copying the reasoning of the Gross Court: the 
ADA, unlike the ADEA, is directly linked to Title VII via cross-
references.176  Here, the ADA’s incorporation of Title VII’s causation 
standard through express cross-references makes explicit amendment to 
the ADA unnecessary.177  Through the ADA’s cross-references, Title 
VII’s remedies apply to the ADA with equal force and validity.178  The 
ADA does not include its own enforcement provisions but rather 
incorporates those of Title VII through the following language in section 
12117(a): 
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 
2000e-5, 2000e-6,  2000e-8, and  2000e-9 of [Title VII] shall be the 
powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to the 
[EEOC], to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging 
discrimination on the basis of disability.179 
 
 171. Id. at 318. 
 172. Hunter v. Valley View Local Sch., 579 F.3d 688, 691 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 173. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 318. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. (citing Gross v. FBL Financial Servs. Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009)). 
 176. Id. at 324 (Clay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 177. Id. at 322. 
 178. Id. 
 179. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006). 
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Of the provisions referenced above, only 2000e-5 is truly an 
enforcement provision.180  The relevant part of this provision, 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B), holds: 
(B) On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 
2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the 
respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor, the court— 
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in 
clause (ii)), and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be directly 
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of 
this title;181 
And finally, 2000e-2(m) holds that: 
Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful employment 
practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any 
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the 
practice.182 
After considering the relevant provisions above, the majority made 
two arguments.  First, the majority argued that the “motivating factor” 
standard from Title VII does not apply to the ADA because it is actually 
embodied in 2000e-2(m), a provision that the ADA does not explicitly 
cross-reference.183  The majority next argued that the motivating factor 
framework laid out in 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), a provision that is cross-
referenced in the ADA, does not actually apply to ADA claimants 
because it starts by stating, “On a claim in which an individual proves 
a violation under section 2000e-2(m).”184  Thus, the majority argued, 
this does not apply to ADA claimants because 2000e-2(m) is a 
provision that applies to Title VII claimants and discrimination based 
on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, not a disability.185 
The majority’s argument that the “motivating factor” standard does 
not apply to the ADA because section 2000e-2(m) of Title VII is not 
directly cross-referenced in the ADA is dishonest.  Clearly 2000e-2(m) 
would not be directly referenced in the ADA’s enforcement provision as 
it, in fact, is not an enforcement provision at all (it simply defines illegal 
 
 180. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 339 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that 
2000e-4 discusses the powers of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 2000e-6 discusses the 
procedures for civil actions brought by the Attorney General, 2000e-8 discusses investigations, and 
2000e-9 discusses hearings and investigations). 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2) (2009). 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 183. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 320. 
 184. Id. at 320–21. 
 185. Id. at 320. 
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conduct) and reference to it as an enforcement provision would be 
nonsensical.186  And while 2000e-2(m) is not referenced specifically in 
the ADA, it is referenced (twice) in the 2000e-5, a section that is 
directly cross-referenced in the ADA.187 
Next, the majority’s argument that 2000e-5’s motivating factor 
language is inapplicable to ADA claimants because it first requires a 
violation of 2000e-2(m), which refers only to race, color, religion, sex, 
and national origin, is facially absurd.  2000e-2(m) refers only to these 
forms of discrimination because these are the forms of discrimination 
addressed in the statute in which it is found.  If 2000e-2(m) had been 
expressly incorporated in the ADA, would it still be available to an 
ADA claimant only if the claimant could also prove racial or gender 
discrimination in addition to disability based discrimination?  Of course 
not.  Additionally, if the majority was really willing to follow this 
extremely literal logic, then it should have been prepared to find the 
entire ADA unenforceable.  Section 12117 of the ADA says, “The 
powers . . . set forth in . . . 2000e-5 [of Title VII] . . . shall be the 
powers . . . of the Commission.”188  Then 2000e-5 says, “The 
Commission is empowered . . . to prevent any person from engaging in 
any unlawful employment practice as set forth in [2000e-2 or 2000e-3] 
of this title.”189  By the majority’s logic, because 2000e-2 and 2000e-3 
are not expressly incorporated into the ADA and refer only to 
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national origin, 
then the Commission has no power at all in relation to the ADA.  Of 
course, the majority would likely not extend their logic to reach this 
absurd result, but it shows the error in the majority’s overly literal 
reasoning. 
Failure to allow liability under the “motivating factor” standard in 
section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of Title VII would be to cross-reference 
remedies for a claim which could not be established.190  It is more than 
reasonable to assume that by referencing these provisions in the ADA, 
Congress intended to make these remedies available to ADA 
claimants.191  Ultimately, Congress’s failure to specifically amend the 
ADA to include motivating factor language is of no consequence.  The 
ADA itself did not need to be amended as the ADA’s cross-references to 
Title VII ensured that any amendments to Title VII’s causation standard, 
 
 186. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 187. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2009). 
 188. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2006). 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2009). 
 190. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 320 (holding that no ADA plaintiffs will prevail under 2000e-2(m) and 
thus remedies under 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) cannot be achieved). 
 191. Id. at 340 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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including the amendments in the CRA of 1991, would also apply to the 
ADA.192  
3. The Timing of the ADA, Price Waterhouse and  the CRA of 1991 
The timing of the ADA’s enactment is crucial to the understanding of 
its meaning.  When the Price Waterhouse decision was handed down in 
1989, the Supreme Court decided that “because of” in the context of 
Title VII included a burden shifting framework in which, if the 
employee showed that an impermissible consideration was a motivating 
factor in an adverse decision, the employer was required to show the 
same decision would have been made absent this impermissible 
consideration.193  The ADA was then adopted just one year later at a 
time when Congress was fully aware of the contemporary interpretation 
of “because of.”194  The logical conclusion is that when Congress used 
the term “because of” in the ADA, it expected it to be interpreted in 
conformity with the term’s understanding at that time.195  As “because 
of” at the time of the ADA’s enactment was understood to incorporate a 
motivating factor/ burden shifting framework, the same standard would 
apply to the ADA.196  And, as discussed above, the ADA’s cross-
reference to Title VII ensured that the amendments made to the Price 
Waterhouse definition of “because of” would also apply to the ADA.197  
The context of the ADA’s enactment stands in sharp contrast to that 
of the ADEA.  The ADEA was adopted in 1967, well before Price 
Waterhouse’s definition of “because of.” This is a major difference 
between the ADEA and the ADA and is yet another reason that the 
majority’s reliance on Gross, without a careful examination of the ADA 
on its own, is misguided.198  While it may have been reasonable for the 
Gross Court to believe that failure to amend the ADEA, which does not 
cross-reference Title VII and was not adopted when “because of” was 
understood to include a “motivating factor” standard, meant that 
Congress did not intend for a “motivating factor” standard to apply to 
the ADEA, the same cannot be said for the ADA.  At the time the CRA 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 261 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 194. Lewis, 681 F. 3d at 326 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 195. N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (“[I]t is not only appropriate but also 
realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [our] precedents . . . and that it expect[s] 
its enactment[s] to be interpreted in conformity with them.”). 
 196. Lewis, 681 F. 3d at 326 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 197. Id. at 322 (Clay, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 198. Id. at 329 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ignoring that context and 
declaring blanket applicability of Gross, the majority assumes that the Supreme Court’s ADEA statutory 
analysis simply transfers to the ADA). 
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of 1991 was adopted, “because of” in the ADA was seen as consistent 
with Price Waterhouse and contained an express cross-reference to Title 
VII.199  The fact that the ADA was not amended does not indicate that 
Congress intended ADA claims to be treated differently from Title VII 
claims; rather it meant just the opposite—that Congress was indicating 
its willingness to continue the existing system of treating ADA claims 
consistently with Title VII claims.  Had this not been the case, Congress 
would have amended the ADA to make this change clear. 
4. The Legislative History of the ADA 
A tenet of statutory construction is that courts are obliged to interpret 
a law consistent with clear legislative intent.200  The Lewis majority 
shirked this obligation by ignoring a mass of legislative history 
indicating that Congress intended the ADA to be interpreted consistent 
with Title VII and thus be governed by a “motivating factor” 
standard.201  A 1990 House Report on the ADA noted, “Because of the 
cross-reference to Title VII [in the ADA], any amendments to Title 
VII . . . would be fully applicable to the ADA.”202  This is direct 
evidence that the amendments made to Title VII via the CRA of 1991, 
which provided for a “motivating factor” standard, were intended to 
apply to the ADA.  The majority countered this piece of legislative 
history simply by saying that it disagreed with the idea that the ADA is 
cross-referenced to Title VII in a way that requires the Title VII 
causation standard to be applied to the ADA.203  What the majority 
failed to realize was that it was not its prerogative to interpret a statute in 
a way that is clearly at odds with legislative intent.  This same report 
further emphasized the congressional intent to make the remedies and 
protections available to Title VII claimants also available to ADA 
claimants when it said: 
An amendment was offered . . . that would have removed the cross-
reference to Title VII and would have substituted the actual words of 
the cross-referenced sections.  This amendment was an attempt to freeze 
the current Title VII remedies in the ADA.  This amendment was rejected 
as antithetical to the purpose of the ADA—to provide civil rights 
protections for persons with disabilities that are parallel to those available 
to minorities and women.  By retaining the cross-reference to Title VII, 
the Committee’s intent is that the remedies of Title VII, currently and as 
 
 199. Id.  
 200. Id. at 331. 
 201. Id.    
 202. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471. 
 203. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 320. 
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amended in the future, will be applicable to persons with disabilities.204 
If further evidence of congressional intent was needed, the 1990 House 
Report also states, “[I]f the powers, remedies and procedures change in 
Title VII, they will change identically under the ADA for persons with 
disabilities.”205  Clearly, Congress intended for the ADA to have 
remedies that were identical to those enumerated in Title VII.  The 
Lewis majority limited the remedies available to an ADA claimant, as 
compared to a Title VII claimant, by eschewing the “motivating factor” 
standard and requiring but-for causation.206 
It is also worth noting that while the majority’s heavy focus on the 
words “because of” is understandable, Congress likely did not intend for 
these words to carry an extreme amount of weight.207  It must be 
remembered that the ADA was adopted in the wake of Price 
Waterhouse, a plurality decision that clearly established a motivating-
factor/burden-shifting framework but failed to come to an exact 
consensus on what “because of” meant.208  The fact that Congress 
nevertheless retained this language is an indication that it is not the 
definition of the term but the associated procedures that matter.209  
Furthermore, had Congress intended the words “because of” to carry 
such great weight and establish but-for causation, why would they have 
amended the ADA in 2008 to replace the term “because of” with “on the 
basis of”?210  The purpose of the amendment was not to help clarify 
“because of” (this was pre-Gross when there was a consensus among the 
circuits on the meaning); rather, the amendment was made for a totally 
unrelated purpose and replacing “because of” with “on the basis of” 
seems to have been simply an innocuous word choice.211  Had “because 
of” been intended to carry so much weight and to be used as the 
determinative causation standard, it is unlikely that Congress would 
have haphazardly discarded the phrase in the 2008 amendment. 
5. Policy Considerations 
Beyond the legal arguments for adopting a “motivating factor” 
 
 204. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485 (III) at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471 
(emphasis added). 
 205. Id.  
 206. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 331 (Stranch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 207. Id. at 315 (stating that no matter the common history and shared goals of the two laws, they do 
not share the same text. Different words usually convey different meanings). 
 208. Id. at 333 (Donald, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 209. Id. 
 210. ADA Amendments Act of 2008. Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 5, 122 Stat. 3553, 3557 (2008).  
 211. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § (2)(a)–(b) (listing the findings and purposes associated 
with amending the ADA, none of which relating to the clarification of the causation standard). 
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standard, there are also strong policy reasons to adopt this standard. 
When taking into the account the stated purpose of the ADA, the 
elimination of disability based discrimination, it becomes clear that a 
“motivating factor” standard is much more compatible with the goals of 
the ADA than a “but for” test.212  A “but for” test does not advocate for 
a complete elimination of disability discrimination; rather, it 
affirmatively allows some amount of discrimination so long as the 
employer has other legitimate reasons for making the adverse 
employment decision.  Instead of conveying that discrimination in any 
amount is unacceptable, a “but for” test sends the message to employers 
that a little disability based discrimination is acceptable, so long as they 
have additional “good” reasons to fire the disabled employee.213  
Allowing any discrimination is at odds with the ADA’s stated purpose: 
“to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination” and “to provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities” by reinstating a broad scope of protection.214  Clearly, a 
“but for” standard is out of touch with the goals of the ADA and the 
intent of Congress. 
Beyond the undesirable message conveyed by a “but for” test, this 
standard is also practically burdensome for ADA claimants.  The “but 
for” standard requires that the plaintiff prove that without his/her 
disability, other negative but non-discriminatory factors would not have 
been enough for the employer to make the same adverse decision.215  
This requires that the employee discover objective evidence of the 
employer’s state of mind and be able to show the employer’s internal 
motivations.216  In other words, the employee is burdened with the 
unreasonable task of identifying the precise causal role play by the 
legitimate and illegitimate motivations.  In practice, an employee will 
rarely be able to discover such objective evidence or prove what role 
different motivations played in the employer’s decision, leaving the 
employer free to offer a parade of pretextual justifications for the 
decision.217  The “motivating factor” standard set out in Title VII more 
appropriately shifts the burden to the employer, who has better access to 
the information used in making the decision, to show that the same 
 
 212. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 324. 
 213. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585 (amending 
Price Waterhouse because [the but-for aspects of its holding] sent a message that a little overt, sexism or 
racism is okay, as  long as it was not the only basis for the employer’s action). 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)–(2) (2009). 
 215. Lewis, 681 F.3d at 323. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
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decision would have been made absent the impermissible 
consideration.218  And even if this is shown, it conveys that any 
disability based discrimination, no matter how small, is impressible by 
imposing limited liability any time discriminatory motivations play a 
role in an adverse employment decision.219  
V. CONCLUSION 
For all of the reasons outlined above, the Lewis majority applied the 
incorrect causation standard to the ADA.  The unfortunate reality is that 
other circuits have already followed this decision, which itself followed 
the Seventh Circuit.220  Continuing this current trend can only work to 
the detriment of ADA claimants and disabled persons in general. 
Fortunately, the ADA’s causation standard is far from being finally 
decided, and there is still hope that the situation can be remedied.  With 
the circuits trending toward a “but for” causation standard, the Supreme 
Court may not grant certiorari on the issue, and thus, going forward, 
reliance on the Supreme Court to correct this error may not be 
advisable.221  There is currently legislation pending in Congress which 
responds to Gross by amending both the ADEA and the ADA to include 
a “motivating factor” standard.222  Unfortunately, this legislation has 
previously stalled in Congress and it is not considered likely to be 
enacted.223  One possible solution to this issue may be found in the 2008 
amendments to the ADA.  Although most courts have considered the 
change inconsequential for purposes of the causation standard, the fact 
that “because of” in the ADA has been amended to read “on the basis 
of” could be a way for future courts to distinguish Lewis which 
interpreted the pre-amendment version of the ADA. 
Ultimately, the Lewis decision is at odds with prior precedent, is 
internally inconsistent, is not mandated by the Supreme Court, is 
contrary to congressional intent, and runs counter to persuasive policy 
considerations.  Accordingly, in order to mitigate the damage caused by 
this decision, it should be invalidated by congressional legislation and 
its reasoning should not be followed by other courts in the future. 
 
 218. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2009). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d. 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010); see also 
Palmquist v. Shinseki, 689 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 221. 23-510 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL § 510.21 (3d ed. 
2010) (describing how the existence of a conflict among circuits has historically been one of the most 
frequent reasons to grant certiorari). 
 222. See Protecting Older Works Against Discrimination Act, S. 2189, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 223. See S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009). 
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